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4 
UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRANT BEHAVIOR IN 
DENMARK: THE IMMIGRANT ENCLAVE AND 
EMPLOYMENT RATE PARADOX 
Andrew Christensen 
Immigrant enclaves and en'lployment rates present a paradox for policymakers in 
Denmark.1 In 1999, only two countries had a larger employment gap between the 
immigrant and native-born population than in Denmark (Roseveare and Jorgensen 2004, 
14). Today, no other country has a larger employment gap between the inunigrant/ native-
born populations than in Denmark (Liebig 2007, 10). Since 1999, non-western inunigrant 
enclaves have continued to develop just as the employment gap between native and foreign 
populations has increased (Olsen and Hansen 2001 , 23/ Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 49) . From 
these trends, one could conveniently assert that enclaves worsen il11lnigrant employment 
rates. But other evidence complicates this picture. The paradox is that while immigrant 
enclaves have low employment rates, itnInigrants that relocate to enclaves have high 
employment rates (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 411Danun and Rosholm 2005,22). Or more 
simply, why do inunigrant enclaves seem to simultaneously hurt and help immigrant 
employment rates? To find out why, this paper will investigate both parts of the paradox. It 
will investigate why inunigrants who relocate to enclaves have high employment rates, and 
exalnine why immigrant enclaves have low employment rates. This paper asserts that 
inIDligrants relocate to enclaves for access to integration resources and co-ethnic networks, 
and that refugees largely account for low employment rates in immigrant enclaves. This 
assertion suggests a way countries can improve inmligration policy. 
By this assertion, this paper challenges two underlying ideas behind many EU 
member-state illlnligrant-placement policies.2 The first idea is that an equal geographic 
distribution of inIDligrants evens out costs among municipalities, increases the rate of 
integration, and improves employment probabilities for inunigrants (Nielsen and Jensen 
2006, 28/ Liebig 2007, 17/ Danun and Rosholm 2005,2) . The second idea is that itnIlligrant 
enclaves slow the rate of integration and decrease inIDligrant employment opportunities 
(Olsen and Hansen 2001 , 30) . This paper calls these two ideas into question with two 
observations. First, inunigrant enclaves unexpectedly lead to positive economic and 
integration outcomes for non-refugees. In order to maxinlize these outcomes, policy should 
place non-refugees according to their preference and where integration resources are most 
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effective. Second, enclaves have low employment ra tes because they have large populations 
of refu gees. In order to counter this trend, policy should distribute refu gees evenly 
throughout the country and continue to focus on resources for refu gees. 
T his paper divides the enclave-employment paradox into two parts. Accordingly, 
section one addresses why immigrants w ho relocate have high employment rates, and 
section two addresses why inunigrant enclaves still have low employment rates. Section 1. 1 
reviews recent literature's claims about the causes and consequences of immigrant enclaves, 
lays out this paper's method for testing these claims, and describes this paper's hypothesis and 
causal logic. Section 1.2 presents evidence for tlus hypothesis, and section 1.3 gives some 
prelinunary conclusions. Section two addresses low employment in imnligrant enclaves. 
1 .1 IMMIGRANT CULTURE, DANISH INSTITUTIONS, AND A DIRE FUTURE 
R ecent literature gives two explanations for w hy imnugrant enclaves emerge and one 
prediction fo r what enclaves mean for the future. The first explanation identifies inmugrant 
culture as the root cause, the second explanation suggests that institutions are the cause. Both 
predict that, without dramatic changes, D enmark is headed toward a dire future. The first 
explanation assumes that immigrants congregate for primarily cultural reasons, or more 
precisely, that their conunon Islanuc religion gives inmugrants strong incentives to create 
close conmmnities (Camre 2007, 195). T his rationale assumes that living in an ethnic enclave 
strengthens an immigrant's sense of security, solidarity and identity (D anun and R oshohn 
2005, 19). Trus explanation offers two solutions to the problems imnligrant enclaves 
potentially pose. It presents massive culture change or complete repatriation to the home 
country as the only viable solutions (Camre 2007, 211 / N annestad and Svendsen 2005, 29). 
Both of these options would be Herculean and costly tasks . If, as the cultural approach 
contends, these are the only options, D anish society faces a serious, and potentially 
paralyzing, dilenuna. 
T he second explanation suggests that bad institutions cause inmugrant enclaves. Trus 
approach argues that integration m easures have not only been na·ive, but also 
counterproductive. For example, Bawer claims that policy has caused "pillarization," or the 
segmenting of society into ethnic groups.3 Imnugration policy, according to Bawer, often 
exposes a type of latent European bigotry that, on the one hand, embraces diversity w hile 
harboring a fear of foreigners on the other (2006,74). This explanation essentially accepts 
the cultural approach , but adds that poor policy has exacerbated the problem of imnugrant 
enclaves. Whatever their differences, bo th viewpoints predict catastrophic economic 
consequences and poor integration outcomes if enclaves continue to develop (Camre 2007 , 
196/ Bawer 2006,70) . These two explanations claim that either institutions or culture cause 
inunigrant enclaves. T his paper will test these two explanations by looking at inunigrant 
relocation behavior. 
A look at inunigrant relocation behavior w ill deternune whether culture or 
institutions cause imnugrant enclaves to fo rm. R elocation is an inu1ugrant's choice to move 
away fro m the policy- assigned place of residence. D anish policy, as previously mentioned, 
places inll1ugrants according to an equal geograpruc distribution, so the individual choice to 
relocate provides a unique access point to analyze inunigrant preferences (see appendix A). 
Two patterns emerge w hen looking at inmugrant relocation behavior. First, inmugrants that 
participate in an integration program are less likely to relocate during the first two years in 
D enmark, and more likely to relocate after the first two years. Conversely, inunigrants that 
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do not participate in an integration program are more likely to move during the first two 
years in Denmark, and less likely to move after the first two years (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 
31). In other words, integration prograuls seem to affect when an immigrant relocates. A 
second relocation pattern emerges regarding place of residence and size of municipality. 
When an inllnigrant's place of residence is in a small municipality, the immigrant is more 
likely to relocate. Conversely, when place of residence is in a large municipality, immigrants 
are less likely to relocate (Dan1l11 and Rosholm 2005, 22). This suggests that the 
characteristics of large and small municipalities are potential causes for relocation among 
inllnigrants. These two relocation patterns indicate that institutions such as municipality 
characteristics and integration programs are plausible causes for enclaves to form. 
Accordingly, institutions constitute my first independent variable in this question. I 
divide institutions into three categories: municipal integration resources, Denmark's 
immigrant-placement policy, and underlying labor market institutions. Denmark's municipal 
integration resources offer recent arrivals a variety of ways to improve their employability. I 
define municipal integration resources as Denmark's post-1999 job training and language 
education programs. This paper measures labor market institutions in terms of municipal 
unemployment rates. This assumes that municipal unemployment rates are fairly good 
markers for underlying labor market institutions. Denm.ark uses a placement policy for 
persons that arrive as refugees. This policy distributes Denmark's annual intake of refugees 
using regional quotas. Between 1986 and 1997, the dispersal policy provided 90% of 
refugees with their initial place of residence (Liebig 2007, 17) . If I find that institutions 
account for most of the relocation patterns among in1l1ugrants, I will accept the institutional 
explanation for why in1l1ugrant enclaves develop. 
Inllnigrant culture is my second independent variable. I define i1lllnigrant culture 
simply as the desire to live in a residential district where the foreign-born population is at 
least 50%. For a recent arrival, co-ethnic networks are a valuable resource for finding a job. 
But if culture causes in1l1ugrant enclaves to form, finding a job should not be the sole 
incentive to live am.ong co- ethnics. Thus if culture is truly a cause, employment 
opportunities should not completely account for relocation behavior among in1l1ugrants. In 
other words, if I find that jobs do not account for most relocation behavior among 
in1l1ugrants, I will not reject the cultural explanation. If institutions cause enclaves to form, 
the incentives from institutions should affect relocation behavior more than the incentives 
to live among co-ethnics. From the evidence in the next section, this paper does not reject 
the cultural explanation, accepts the institutional explanation and asserts that the prediction 
of a dire future for Denmark is exaggerated. 
1.2 INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS AND POSITIVE OUTCOMES 
Data on municipality size, employment rates, and relocation support the institutional 
explanation for why enclaves form. Men who live in smaller municipalities, compared to 
men who reside in a large municipality, have a 33% to 84% higher relocation rate; for 
women, the corresponding rates are 66% and 102% (Danlln and Rosholm 2005, 22). In 
other words, larger municipalities have lower rates of relocation, and smaller municipalities 
have higher rates of relocation. This evidence can support both the institutional and cultural 
explanation for relocation. 
To explain this correlation between size of municipality and rate of relocation, the 
institutional approach argues that municipal integration resources might affect the relocation 
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rate. This is because smaller municipalities often lack integration resources for incoming 
immigrants due to either a lack of experience or declining numbers of immigrants. Smaller 
numbers of immigrants make it difficult to generate scale economies for job training and 
language education (Liebig 2007, 62). T his might give incentive for inulligrants to shop for 
better options in larger municipalities that have well-established scale economies and a 
broader range of vocational and language education resources. In other words, the 
institutional approach argues that integration resources strongly influence an inunigrant's 
decision to m ove to larger municipalities. 
Nielsen and Jensen 's findings support this institutional explanation. They compare the 
relative effects of the post- 1999 integration program and municipality size on inulligrant 
relocation rates. T hey find that 6% of inulligrants in the program move to larger 
municipalities. Comparatively, 36% of immigrants not in the integration program move to 
larger municipaliti es (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 43) . Furthermore, participation in the 
integration program has a larger effect on relocation than civil status, age, and children 
effects (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 33-57). This suggests that there is a link between 
integration resources and an inUlugrant's decision to relocate. In other words, evidence 
supports this paper's thesis that institutions strongly affect relocation behavior. 
The cultural perspective offers an alternative to this institutional argument. This 
approach argues that because larger municipalities have larger amounts of co-ethnics, 
inunigrants tend to move to larger municipalities (Chiswick and Miller 2002, 4). Evidence 
supports this rationale, but it does not prove that culture motivates relocation. As an 
example, a 1% increase in the local number of inulligrants decreases the relocation rate by 
9.5% for men and 17% for women (D amm and R osholm 2005, 22). As the number of 
immigrants increases in an area, the greater the likelihood that inulligrants will choose to 
stay. Conversely, as iml1ugrants become less numerous, the more inunigrants tend to move. 
This pattern suggests that cultural preference to live aillong co-ethnics may account for an 
increase in the rate of relocation. H owever, other evidence shows that economic preference 
may account for this pattern as well . Co-ethnic networks account for 55% of the employed 
inunigrant population, whereas institutions account for 15% of j obs among the employed 
inUlugrant population (Schultz-Nielsen 2005, 75) .4 Comparatively, networks account for 
44% of j obs among employed Danes where institutions account for 10% of jobs (Schultz-
Nielsen 2005, 75). In other words , co-ethnic networks are relatively more important for an 
imnugrant's employment opportunities than for a D ane's . 
This suggests that employment opportunities motivate immigrants to form enclaves. 
While culture may still motivate il1Ulugrants to live am ong co-ethlucs, the evidence does 
not directly prove this explanation. Instead , it strongly suggests that underlying labor market 
institutions affect relocation behavior am ong inUlugrants. So far, evidence supports the 
institutional explanation because it shows that integration resources decrease relocation rates 
by 30% (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 43). Further evidence suggests that labor market 
institutions likely affect place of relocation. To further test whether labor market institutions 
cause relocation and what the consequences of enclaves are for employment, I look at 
municipal unemployment rates. 
Municipal unemployment rates affect w here inUlugrants move to, but have only a 
slight effect on how often inunigrants relocate. Interestingly, inUlugrants that relocate have 
higher rates of employment compared to il1Ulugrants that do not relocate (D anull and 
Rosholm 2005, 23-24/ Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 46-47). In addition , inllnigrants tend to 
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move away from municipalities with high unemployment rates (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 
46). This strongly suggests that employment opportunity motivates relocation among 
immigrants; however, both studies by Danm1/ Rosholm and Nielsen/Jensen counter with 
this institutional approach with an important point. After controlling for socioeconomic 
factors, they suggest that employment rates alone are not enough to account for inmugrants' 
decision to move. However, the evidence does suggest that municipal unemployment rates 
help inmugrant enclaves to form insofar as they affect the place of relocation. To tlus !inuted 
extent, this supports this paper's thesis that institutions help cause enclaves to form. So far, 
institutions seem to affect relocation behavior slightly more than immigrant culture. And if 
institutions have a stronger influence, it suggests that changing policy is a viable option for 
changing inmugrant relocation behavior. This is important because it counters the notion 
that complete repatriation or massive culture change are the only viable solutions for the 
low inmugrant employment rates. In order to find how institutions might be part of a third 
solution, the next portion of this paper exanunes the econonuc effects of inmugrant 
enclaves. 
Evidence decisively counters the prediction that imnugrant enclaves lead to poor 
econonuc and integration outcomes. Most inmugrant enclaves develop in large 
municipalities. Large municipalities , on average, have more favorable labor market 
characteristics (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 46/ Danun and Rosholin 2005, 24). Favorable labor 
market characteristics accelerate the speed at which inmugrants find their first job (Danun 
and Rosholin 2005, 20). And having a job significantly increases the rate of language 
acquisition, even after controlling for socio-econonuc characteristics (Clausen and Husted 
2005,13). This suggests that the development of inmugrant enclaves provide positive 
economic and integration outcomes. 
These positive outcomes call into question the effectiveness of Denmark's inmugrant-
placement policy. Using a counterfactual-simulation model, Damm and Rosholm find that 
the pre-1 999 placement policy did not promote the integration process. Indeed, a removal 
of the policy might have quickened integration rates, because the immigrant relocation 
process delayed their entrance into the labilr market (Danun and Roshom 2005,29). This 
suggests that an equal distribution of inunigrants may not be optimal policy. Despite this, 
the post-1999 policy still operates on the assumption that an even spread of inmugrants is 
best, and distinguishes itself from the previous policy by discouraging relocation. It 
discourages relocation by withholding integration resources from inunigrants that move. If 
D anun and Rosholin 's counterfactual predictions are correct, the post-1999 policy should 
then still be delaying integration rates. Prelinunary evidence supports this prediction in the 
long-term, but suggests that this is not the case for the first four years of residence. In fi gure 
1, the post-1999 policy seems to increase imnugrant employment rates for the first four 
years relative to the pre-1999 policy (Leibig 2007, 35). 
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Figure 1: Employment rates by duration of residence in Denmark, men and women, 16-64 
years old, 1999 and 20045 
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The initial increase in employment rates corresponds to the four-year integration 
programs that municipalities implemented under the post-1 999 policy. This suggests that 
integration resources play a critical role in improving employment and integration 
outcomes for immigrants. After the first four years of residence, however, the post- 1999 
policy seems not to have any distinct advantage over the previous policy. Post-1 999 
employment rates even dip below previous rates at the seven-year mark . A plausible 
.; explanation for this is that the incentive for an immigrant to relocate might be latent due 
to integration programs in the first four years. Tlus suggests that, after the first four years, the 
post- 1999 policy has the same inefficiencies as its predecessor, and that Damm and 
R osholm's prediction is still at play. In other words, inunigrant- placement policy may still 
be slowing the integration process in the long term. This conclusion is tentative because this 
policy is relatively new and its long-term effects renun largely unknown. The prelinunary 
evidence does however support this paper's thesis about how Denmark could improve its 
inmugrant-placement policy, namely, that policy can improve by taking municipal 
integration resources and inmugrant preferences into greater consideration. By increasing 
integration resources, the post-1 999 policy improved short-term employment outcomes. To 
improve long-term employment outcomes, policy should let irml1igrant preferences 
deternune initial placement. 
1.3 INSTITUTIONS AND IMPROVING IMMIGRANT-PLACEMENT POLICY 
SO far the evidence offers some prelinunary conclusions. Inmugrants relocate to 
enclaves for access to integration resources and co-ethnic networks. Econonuc m otives 
likely explain why inmugrants want access to co-ethnic networks, but cultural reasons are 
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still plausible. Municipal integration resources and unemployment rates help cause 
inillligrant enclaves to form. Integration resources increase relocation rates. Unemployment 
rates affect the destination of imnligrant relocation . Because institutions seem to encourage 
the development of immigrant enclaves, I accept tllis part of the institutional approach. 
Because inunigrant culture remains plausible, I do not reject the cultural approach. This does 
not mean policymakers should discard inunigrant culture as a cause, but rather, that they 
should put it into proper perspective. 
In addition, immigrant enclaves lead to certain positive employment and integrati on 
outcomes. This counters the prediction that enclaves signal a dire future for Denmark. 
Policymakers often assume that enclaves slow the rate of integration; however, the evidence 
suggests that relocation increases the rate of integration. Policymakers also assume that 
imnligrant enclaves develop in places with low labor demand; however, relocation clearly 
increases employm ent opportunities for inillligrants. In making these conclusions, this paper 
assumes that imnligrants relocate to places where enclaves are developing. Nielsen and 
Jensen 's data supports this assumption (see Appendix B). In short, the prediction that 
inunigrant enclaves wi]] lead to poor econonll c and integration outcomes seems 
exaggerated and inaccurate. In light of tllis, Dallish immigrant-placement policy should do 
two things. Policy should continue to support municipal integration resources and begin to 
allow immigrant preference to determ.ine the initial place of residence. The next section will 
provide evidence that supports these policy reconunendations. 
2. Low EMPLOYMENT IN IMMIGRANT ENCLAVES 
Up to this point, this paper has accounted for the latter part of the enclave-
employment paradox. R emember, the paradox is that wllile immigrant enclaves have low 
employment rates, inunigrants that move to enclaves have high employment rates (Nielsen 
and Jensen 2006, 41 IDanun and R osholm 2005,22) . This paper has thus far maintained that 
enclaves help integration because inunigrants that move to them are more likely to get a 
job. The question then remains, if inunigrant enclaves help, why do they still hurt? In other 
words, what accounts fo r the low employment rates in inunigrant enclaves? This section 
asserts that the high number of refu gees in inunigrant enclaves largely accounts for low 
employment rates. 
This part of the enclave-employment paradox is relevant for Danish policymakers. 
Currently, the employment gap between the non-OECD and native population is fourteen 
percentage points in Derunark (Liebig 2007, 11) . In addition, most non-OECD inillligrants 
in D enmark live in enclaves (Clausen and Hununelgaard 2007, 20) .This suggests that a close 
look at the conditions of inunigrant enclaves could lend insight as to why employment rates 
remain low among inunigrants. Ultimately, a better understanding of enclave conditions 
could lead to better policy decisions. Thus, the next portion of this paper will investigate 
whether institutional, cultural , or reason- for-migration effects account for low employment 
among inunigrants in enclaves.6 This paper asserts that, while the institutional and cultural 
fa ctors have an influence, inunigrants' reason-for- nligration in large measure accounts for 
low employment in imnligrant enclaves. Section 2.1 addresses recent literature's claims and 
lays out this paper's method for testing these claims. Sections 2.2 , 2.3,2.4, and 2.5 consider 
the impact of integration m easures, welfare program s, reason-for- lnigrationl country-of-
origin, and self-employment respectively on enclave employment rates. Section 2.6 
concludes. 
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2.1 IMMIGRANT CULTURE, NATIVE INSTITUTIONS OR REFUGEES 
COl1mlOn explanations for inmugrant low employment break along cultural and 
institutional lines. The cultural camp asserts that Muslims have a strong aversion to work 
(Camre 2006, 207). Tlus approach argues that because of Islamic culture, only a small 
number of non-OECD inmugrants will be able to work in a western society (Camre 2006, 
195). An example of the cultural rationale here is instructive. A devout Muslim will refuse 
to work in a place that may result in interaction with the opposite sex, or where employers 
do not allow for prayers five times a day. For followers of the Wahabi order of Islam, 
appearance plays an important role. Wahabi males will generally grow beards and wear a hat. 
Thus, when a profession requires the removal of beards and hats,Wahabi Muslims will often 
disnuss the employment opportunity. Self-employment thus becomes an attractive option 
for the devout Muslim inmugrant because it allows them to earn money without 
compromising religion. But if Islanuc culture causes low employment among non-western 
immigrants, how does one account for low employment among western inmugrants as well? 
Inmligrants in Denmark, regardless of where they come from, have lower em.ployment rates 
than the native-born population (Liebig 2007, 5). 
The second explanation accounts for this exception by adding that institutions also 
cause low employment among non-western inmugrants. This approach argues that Danish 
institutions, reflected in low returns on foreign qualifications, restrict many imnugrants from 
entering the workforce (Nannestad 1999, 196-197/Clausen and Hunm1elgaard 2007,21). 
Prohibitive policy, according to this argument, reflects a bigotry that is willing to donate aid 
to foreign countries but labels foreigners as incapable of work or undesirable as colleagues 
(Bawer 2006,70-72). The first app·roach faults inmugrant culture where the second blames 
native institutions for the low employment rates in inurugrant enclaves. Whether the 
explanation· is culture or institutions is an important question . If enclaves have poor 
employment because of culture, it leaves Denmark with two Herculean tasks: either large-
scale culture change or massive repatriation. If enclaves have poor employment because of 
policy, however, it leaves Denmark with a more feasible choice: namely, to improve its 
institutions in inmugrant enclaves. While these are not the only two explanations, they both 
are mainstays in public opinion and official policy (Gaasholt and Togeby 1995, 147-65). 
To address this part of the enclave-employment paradox, I operationalize institutions 
as integration measures and welfare programs. I operationalize culture as country-of-origin 
effects and an imnugrant's choice to be unemployed rather than self-employed. To evaluate 
this paper's thesis that refugees largely account for low enclave employment, I operationalize 
refugee as an illmugrant's reason-for-nugration. I defend these choices in the sections to 
follow. 
2.2 IMPACT OF INTEGRATION MEASURES ON EMPLOYMENT 
If, as the institutional approach suggests, a lack of integration measures lower 
employment, then as integration measures improve, there should be a corresponding rise in 
employment rates. Evidence supports this hypothesis. After 1999 and especially after 2001, 
Denmark adopted sweeping measures that focused on integration. In the years that 
followed , non-western inmugrants that had arrived within one to seven years began to enter 
the labor market more quickly and more often relative to the pre-1999 policy, as can be seen 
in Figure 1. The new integration policy accelerated the trend of convergence between 
foreign- and native- born employment rates and increased employment probabilities for 
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immigrants across the board (Liebig 2007, 35). Tills evidence suggests that integration 
measures strongly affect employment rates in the short-term. In Figure 1, the accelerated 
rate of employment in the first seven years of residence supports the prediction that 
institutions influence employment. H owever, the slight downward turn after the seven-year 
mark complicates the picture. Why do institutional effects decrease after the first seven-
years? T he cultural approach offers an explanation for tills downward turn. For example, 
employment might taper off because of receding integration incentives and resurgent 
country-of-origin effects, such as Islamic culture. The features shown in Figure 1 do not 
support disprove tills explanation, so it remains plausible. So far, the evidence could support 
either explanation. Another study helps locate the causes for these patterns more precisely. 
During the sam e time period (1999-2006), municipal integration measures accounted 
for 22% of the employment rate among inunigrants. N on-municipal causes---such as 
immigrant age, civil status, children, period of residence, health , and country-of-origin-
accounted for 78% of the inu11.igrant employment rates (Husted and Nielsen and H einesen 
2007,9) . Tlus shows, in a fairly precise way, that sometillng other than institutions has a large 
effe ct on employm.ent rates in enclaves. The fact that country-of-origin is in the 78% group 
suggests that culture may have a stronger effect than institutions on inunigr.mt employment. 
Furthermore, the data from the study show that integration measures are most effective in 
areas with inU1ugrant enclaves. As an example of tills, Figure 2 shows that integration 
programs have above average success rates in municipalities with large numbers of 
immigrant enclaves (Husted and Nielsen and Heinesen 2007,59-60). 
Figure 2. Success rate for immigrants in integration programs (1999-2006) 
Municipalities with many immigrant enclaves 
Denmark Copenhagen Arhus Esbjerg 
36% 53% 40% 37% 
Municipalities with little or no immigrant enclaves 
Denmark Silkeborg Skive SOf0 
36% 30% 19% 31 % 
Note: Figures show the percelllage of immigrants that complete a program with a job or in education 
Figure 2 also shows that integration programs have below average success rates in 
municipalities with little o r no enclaves. In short, integration programs in municipalities 
with enclaves produce better employment outcomes compared to municipalities with little 
or no enclaves. Tills supports the rationale that, because small municipalities lack scale 
econonues for integration programs, inu11.igrants have poorer employment outcomes in 
smaller municipalities (Liebig 2007, 62) . It also suggests that integration measures do not 
lower employment rates in inunigrant enclaves. So far, it seems institutions help employment 
rates in enclaves wh.ile i.l1unigrant culture effects on enclave-employment rates remain 
unclear. N ext, this paper will deternune whether welfare programs are an institutional cause 
for low employm.ent in enclaves. 
2.3 IMPACT OF WELFARE PROGRAMS ON EMPLOYMENT 
If the institutional explanation is correct, than welfare programs should discourage 
inmugrant employment. Evidence supports tills explanation . Welfare programs lead to lower 
employment rates among inunigrants because they give strong incentives to remain 
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unemployed. Denmark 's welfare benefits for the unemployed are alllong the highest in the 
OEeD. Tlus is because D enmark 's welfare scheme relies on flat- rate benefits, which result 
in very high net replacement ra tes for low former incom e levels (Liebig 2007, 37). T hese 
features can lead to an odd incentive situation called an unemployment trap, where the 
incentives of unemployment offset the incentives of employment (Pedersen 2005, 17). M any 
inunigrants in D enmark are in unemployment traps. Between 15-30% of unemployed 
inunigrants would lose money by working (Schultz-Nielsen 2001, 55). Equally important 
are inunigrant perceptions about unemployment advantages. Here, Schultz-Nielsen finds 
that 22% of unemployed non-western inunigrants believed they would receive less or equal 
pay if they had a j ob (2001,80). This suggests that unemploym ent can, in some cases, be an 
econonlic preference instead of a cultural choice. T his supports the institutional explanation 
for low employment outcomes. 
Other surveys about unemployment benefits support the cultural explanation . 
Schultz-Nielsen observes that unemployed inmugrants were less willing to accept long 
conU1ll1te times for a new j ob than unemployed D anes (2001,77-78). Whether this 
difference in preference reflects a difference in culture is unclear, but a cultural explanation 
is certainly plausible. O n the other hand, unemployed inunigrants were about as w illing as 
D anes to move in o rder get a new j ob (Schultz-Nielsen 2001,80) . In sum, it seems that high 
unemployment benefits discourage employm ent among inunigrants with low income, and 
unemployed inmugrants seem somewhat less willing than unemployed D anes to become 
employed. In short, welfare programs lead to lower employment outcomes. In this category, 
institutions hurt m ore than they help, but in both categories so fa r, inunigrant culture effects 
remain at play. To test for inunigrant culture, the next porti on of this paper will compare 
country-of- origin effects relative to reason-for-nugration effects. 
2.4 COUNTRY-Of-ORIGIN AND REASON-fOR-MIGRATION EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT 
If the cultural explanation is true, then an inmugrant 's country-of-origin should have 
a larger effect on employm ent than an inmugrant's reason to inmugrate. For the following 
analysis, an inunigrant's status as a refugee or non-refu gee will represent the reason-for-
nugration. Evidence strongly counters the cultural explanation. R efugees have signifi cantly 
lower employment rates than non-refu gee inunigrants (Liebig 2007, 69). In addition, data 
shows that reason-for-nugration effects clearly outweigh the impact of country-of-origin 
effects on imnligrant employment rates (Liebig 2007, 69) . Another study supports these 
findings. Male refu gees from Sri Lanka, Iran and Iraq have 39% employment compared to 
66% for male non-refugees from the same countries. In all, there is a 30% difference in 
employment rates between refugees and non-refu gees in D enmark (Husted et . aI 2000, 8/ 
Husted and Nielsen and H einesen 2007, 84) . In other words, the employment gap between 
refugees and non-refu gees (30%) is comparable to the gap between natives and inunigrants 
(30.5%). This evidence brings forward an important question. H ow do non-refu gee 
il1mugrant employment rates compare to native-born employment rates for this time 
period? This is a relevant question because if the non- refu gee rate is comparable to the 
native rate, it would also strongly counter the cultural explanation for low inunigrant 
employment rates. It would suggest that refu gees largely account for overall low 
employment rates am ong inmugrants. 
This, however, is not the case. Among males, the native-born employment ra te is 89% 
compared to 72% am ong non- refu gee imnugrants (Husted et. a] 2000,8). This suggests that 
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other fac tors must account for the remaining 13% gap. In other words, this shows that the 
inunigrant culture might account for the gap. Furthermore, if this 2001 study included 
women, it would probably widen the non-refugee/native employment gap. This is because 
immigrant women have lower employment rates than native-born women (Nielsen et . al 
2000, 1) . Tlus also suggests inmugrant culture nught discourage women from entering the 
workforce. In other words, imm.igrant culture partially accounts for overall low employment 
among inmugrants. But this only shows how culture affects inunigrant employment overall. 
It does not suggest that culture affects enclave-employment rates to the same degree. Indeed, 
further evidence suggests that reason-for-migration effects largely account for low enclave 
employm ent rates. 
R efugees largely account fo r low employm ent rates in inmugrant enclaves. With 
refugees and non-refu gees included, the 1995 employment rate was 58.5%. Without 
refugees, the employment rate was 72% (Husted et. al 2000,8) . Thus refugees lowered the 
inmugrant employm ent rate by 13.5%. This is especially telling for employment in enclaves 
because D anish policy in 1995 placed refugees in large municipalities where enclaves were 
more likely to form (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 59). This evidence supports tlus paper's thesis 
that refu gees largely account for low employment in inun.igrant enclaves. In sum, reason-
for-nugration effects clearly outweigh country-of-origin effects on inlln.igrant employment 
rates. Wlule inmugrant culture possibly affects employment rates overall, the reason- for-
nugration definitely affects enclave-employment rates. To further test for inmugrant culture 
effects, the next section will deternune whether imnugrants prefer unemployment to self-
employment. 
2.4 IMMIGRANT CULTURE EFFECTS ON SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
The cultural approach argues that Islanuc culture engenders a strong aversion to work 
among inun.igrants. If this rationale is true, then inun.igrants that learn of and qualify for 
benefits over time should become gradually more dependent on welfare programs. Evidence 
counters this prediction . D ata shows that as an inun.igrant's years of residence increase, the 
level of welfare dependency decreases (Blume and Verner 2007, 14,31 ). In other words, non-
western inun.igrants tend to become self-sufficient as they stay in Denmark longer. This 
strongly counters the claim that culture engenders an aversion to work among immigrants. 
The cultural approach also asserts that inmugrant culture affects the preferred mode of 
employment among inmugrants. If this is true, inun.igrants nught select self-employment 
even at the price of earning less than other inmugrant wage earners. This approach asserts 
that benefits from self-employment outweigh the cost of earning less because it allows an 
inmugrant to run a business without compronusing religious belief. Evidence supports this 
pred.iction (see Figure 3) (Andersson and Wadensjo 2004, 16). 
Figure 3: Mean annual earnings of employed non-western immigrants in Denmark in 1999 
Wage earners $30,358 
Self-employed $13,665 
Difference in annual wages $16,873 
Compared to non-western inun.igrant wage earners, self-employed non-western 
inmugrants earn alm.ost $17,000 dollars less per year. Even compared to unemployed D anes, 
self-employed inlln.igrants earn less (Liebig 2007, 40). In other words, inmugrants are willing 
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to be self-employed even when that means earning less than wage earners. This suggests that 
immigrants might choose self-employment for cultural reasons. H owever, further evidence 
counters this cultural interpretation. Recent data shows that self-employment is an escape 
route out of unemployment for many non-western immigrants (Blume et. al 2005, 221 
Andersson and Wadensj o 2004, 16). In addition , because wages and labor demand are 
particularly low in immigrant enclaves compared to other areas, more immigrants in 
enclaves prefer self-employment, w here they can rely on the enclave for continued business 
(Constant and Z immerman 2005, 13/ Leibig 2007, 48) . In other words, non-western 
inunigrants do not necessarily prefer self- employment to wage earning, but simply prefer 
self-employment to unemployment. T his suggests that inunigrants do not choose self-
em ployment for cultural reasons, but rather, choose self- employment in order to be more 
self- sufficient. Liebig comes to a similar conclusion (2007,38). In sum, the evidence shows 
that inmligrants over time depend less on welfare and suggests that immigrants prefer self-
employment to welfare dependency.Tllis evidence directly counters the cultural explanation 
because it demonstrates that inmligrants' aversion to unemployment is stronger than their 
aversion to work. 
2.6 REFUGEES, ENCLAVES AND EMPLOYMENT 
O n balance, it seems that willie institutions and inmligrant culture have an influence, 
the reason-for-migration in large measure accounts for low employment in inmligrant 
enclaves. Institutions have an impact, but because integration measures and welfa re programs 
respectively encourage and discourage employment in inmligrant enclaves, it remains 
difficult to detennine the net effect. Inulligrant culture may affect overall employm ent rates, 
but compared to the reason-for-nligration, the latter likely has a larger effect on enclave 
employment rates. R efu gees in imnligrant enclaves clearly lower employment rates. O f the 
three variables this section addressed, the reason-fo r-nligration seems to have the largest 
effect . T his suggests that imnligrant enclaves are far less burdensome than the refugees within 
them are. 
In light of this, policymakers should focus legislation on refu gees rather than 
immigrant enclaves. Placement- policy should distribute refu gees evenly throughout the 
country to spread costs among municipalities. For non-refugees, however, policy should 
allow inunigrant preference and municipal integration resources to deternline initial 
placement. In addition , policymakers should consider encouraging entrepeneurship am ong 
inmligrants, foster more lucrative options for the self- employed, and move away fro m a flat-
rate benefit scheme fo r the unemployed. These suggestions come with a small caveat, 
however, as there are certain drawbacks to this paper 's methods. 
T his paper has (at least) two Iinlitations- one large and one small . The large limitation 
is that this paper's three variables-reason-for-nligration, institutions, and inunigrant 
culture-do not offer a complete picture for why low employment rates persist in 
imnligrant enclaves . R ecent studies strongly suggest that other causes are at play. These 
include age, civil status, number of children , health, local labor demand, and employer 
behavior (Husted and Nielsen and Heinesen 2007, 84/ Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 33-571 
Leibig 2007, 48, 59/ C lausen and HUllUnelgaard 2007, 21). Because this paper does not 
evaluate these variables, it cannot offer a comprehensive explanation for the enclave-
employment paradox. The small Iinlitation is that this paper nlisrepresents mainstream 
explanations for the enclave-employment paradox by testing M ogens Camre and Bruce 
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Bawer's claims. This is because Camre and Bawer represent two sides of what is ultimately 
the same anti-inunigration position.7They only represent the far-right portion of the public 
discourse on inunigration. Because this paper does not evaluate a broader range of 
explanations, it risks being irrelevant to the mainstream discourse. 
Despite these lirnitations, this paper contributes to the immigration debate by 
pinpointing where hyperbole ends and the core problem begins. This paper considers and 
counters three provocative and increasingly popular parts of the anti-inunigration position. 
First, the anti-inunigration camp insists that others take their claims seriously and not write 
them off as racist. In response to this request, tlus paper tests their culture claim and 
concludes that culture is likely a part of the enclave paradox. Their culture claim is not 
necessarily racist rhetoric, but it is perhaps a bit overblown. Second, this camp predicts 
economic collapse for countries that continue to allow non-western ilTUnigration. They 
claim that the only solutions are complete repatriation or massive culture change (Camre 
2006, 177, 211). The evidence in this paper proves these claims to be exaggerated and 
inaccurate. Enclaves are not the result of inunigrant culture as much as they are a product 
of inunigrant economic preferences. In addition, institutions have and can continue to 
improve conditions in immigrant enclaves. Tlurd, this camp contends that native institutions 
reflect a latent bigotry by pillarizing society. This paper counters this claim by providing 
evidence that immigrant decisions, not native institutions, largely account for the 
development of enclaves. In sum, there is ample evidence to suggest that institutions can 
improve employment rates in inmugrant enclaves by providing resources to refugees. 
Therefore, while Denmark should not discard culture as a cause, it should not let it distract 
policy decisions. In short, the hype about enclaves should not divert the focus on refugees. 
END NOTES 
1. 11TU1ugrant enclaves are residential districts in Dalush municipalities where at least 50% 
of the population are inunigrants. As an example, the residential district N0rrebro in 
Copenhagen has 24.1% immigrants compared to all of Copenhagen's 16.5% (Olsen 
and Hansen 2001, 23) . These enclaves range in size. They can be a single aparunent 
complex, such as Langelinje in Silkeborg, or an entire residential district, such as 
N0rrebro in Copenhagen. 
2. In particular, this paper bases it conclusions on studies of Denmark's dispersal policy 
from 1986 to 1998 and 1999 to 2007 respectively. See Danun and Rosholm (2005)/ 
Nielsen and Jensen (2006). 
3. Pillarization alludes to the Dutch word verzeilung. It refers to a Dutch mode of 
tolerance that emerged in the late nineteenth century. The system of verzeilung at 
that time featured groups that coexisted separately and only interacted at the level 
of government, such as the Catholics and Socialists. 
4. Institutions defined as jobs provided by the job center, the unemployment insurance 
fund, or the municipality. 
5. In Figure 1, Leibig holds native-born employment rates constant in order to depict the 
extent to ' which foreign-born rates are converging with native-born rates. 
6. "Reason-for-lnigration" is how this paper operationalizes the effect that a refugee has 
on employment compared to a non-refugee inmugrant. 
7. Mogens Camre, a leader in the Danish People's Party and member of the European 
Parliament, is an outspoken anti-inmugration politician. Bruce Bawer is an 
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American journalist who has boosted his career by criticizing Islamic culture and 
Europe's open embrace of Muslim immigrants. 
ApPENDIX A 
Tllis map represents the distribution change between Denmark post-1999 placement 
policy and the pre-1999 placement policy. Green municipalities received more immigrants 
after 1999, while yellow m.unicipalities received less immigrants (Nielsen and Jensen 2006, 
74). 
Larger municipalities known for their large immigrant enclaves received less 
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immigrants after 1999. These municipalities include Copenhagen, Arhus, Odense, Aalborg, 
Skive, Kolding, and Esbjerg. This suggests that current policy seeks a more even distribution 
of inunigrants throughout the country. 
ApPENDIX B 
This map shows the distribution of ilmnigrants that moved for the first time from 
1997 to 2005 (Nielsen and Jensen 2006,41). 
$.,1 '>. it}::!,! 
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There is a clear tendency for ilmnigrants to move to cities with large inunigrant 
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populations. These cities include Copenhagen, Arhus, Odense, Esbjerg,Aalborg, Kolding and 
Vejle. 
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